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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Joshua Lee Bosier appeals from entry of the third amended judgment of
conviction and order suspending sentence following a remand on appeal of his
conviction for possession of a controlled substance.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedinqs
Bosier pled guilty to and was sentenced for possession of a controlled
substance; the underlying course of proceedings was outlined by the Idaho
Court of Appeals as follows:
Bosier pled guilty to felony possession of a controlled
substance, I.C. Ej 37-2732(c). In exchange for his guilty plea, the
state dismissed additional charges, including an allegation that
Bosier was a persistent violator. At that time, Bosier was involved
in four different criminal cases in various stages before three
different courts. The district court sentenced Bosier to a unified
term of seven years, with a minimum period of confinement of three
years. The district court suspended Bosier's sentence and placed
him on probation for seven years. The district court also ordered
the sentence to run concurrently with Bosier's sentence in another
unrelated case for which he had been placed on probation.
One month later, the district courts summoned Bosier for
another hearing. At that time, the district court explained that it was
previously under the mistaken belief that Bosier had a retained
jurisdiction opportunity in one of his other cases when, in fact,
jurisdiction had been relinquished. The district court then entered
an amended judgment of conviction sentencing Bosier to a unified
term of seven years, with a minimum period of confinement of three
years. The amended judgment of conviction had the effect of
revoking Bosier's probation and reinstating the sentence of the
original judgment of conviction. The district court ordered the
sentence to run concurrently with all other sentences currently
being sewed by Bosier.
One week later, Bosier wrote a letter to the district court
alleging that it had revoked his probation without cause and asking

the district court to reduce his sentence. The district court treated
the letter as an I.C.R. 35 motion to reduce Bosier's sentence. After
a hearing, the district court entered a second amended judgment of
conviction modifying Bosier's sentence to a unified term of seven
years, with a minimum period of confinement of two years.
State v. Bosier, 2009 Unpublished Opinion No. 439, pp. 1-2 (Idaho App., April 29,

Bosier appealed the revocation of his probation (#34745 R., pp. 57-59),
asserting that the district court violated his right to due process by doing so
without notice and absent a finding that he had violated any term or condition of
his probation. (#34745 Appellant's brief, pp. 7-14). The Court of Appeals agreed
and ordered "Bosier's first and second amended judgments of conviction for
possession of a controlled substance [ ] vacated" and remanded the case "for
reinstatement of the original probation."

a. at 3.

With respect to the second

amended judgment, the Court of Appeals stated
Bosier's second amended judgment of conviction which reduced
the determinate portion of his sentence pursuant to Bosier's Rule
35 motion is necessarily vacated as it followed the first amended
judgment of conviction which erroneously revoked Bosier's
probation. Accordingly, the probation term of his original judgment
of conviction is in effect, and we do not further address Bosier's
argument that the district court erred by not further reducing his
sentence pursuant to Rule 35.

Bosier's original judgment imposed:
an aggregate term of seven (7) years, to be sewed as follows: a
minimum period of confinement of three (3) years, followed by a
subseauent indeterminate period of custody not to exceed four (4)
years with said term to run concurrently with Ada County Case No.
H0400385 said term to commence immediately;

PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that this judgment shall be, and is
hereby suspended, and the defendant is placed on probation for
seven (7) years commencing on October 3,2007. . ..
(#34745 R., p. 43. (emphasis and capitalization original).) Upon remand, the
district court heard from the parties and, in reinstating Bosier's probation, issued
a third amended judgment of conviction and order suspending sentence
imposing:
an aggregate term of seven (7) years, to be sewed as follows: a
minimum period of confinement of three (3) years, followed by a
subsequent indeterminate period of custody not to exceed four (4)
years with said term to run concurrently with Ada County Case No.
H0400385, and to run consecutively to the defendant's Canyon
County sentences.
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that this judgment shall be, and is
hereby suspended, and the defendant is placed on probation for
seven (7) years commencing upon the defendant's release from
prison.
(R., p. 12 (emphasis and capitalization original).) Bosier timely appeals. (R., pp.

Bosier states the issues on appeal as follows:
1.

Did the district court lack jurisdiction in this case to alter Mr.
Bosier's underlying sentence upon remand from the ldaho
Court of Appeals specifically directing the district court to
reinstate "the original probation" as ordered in Mr. Bosier's
original judgment of conviction?

2.

Did the district court err when it increased the aggregate
term of Mr. Bosier's sentence through filing an amended
judgment of conviction and sentence when the ldaho Court
of Appeals did not vacate Mr. Bosier's original judgment of
conviction and sentence?

3.

Did the district court impose a vindictive sentence when it
increased the aggregate term of Mr. Bosier's judgment of
conviction and sentence upon Mr. Bosier's successful
appeal?

(Appellant's brief, p. 5)
The state rephrases the issues as follows:
1. Has Bosier failed to show that the district court was without jurisdiction to
amend his judgment on remand to indicate whether the sentence originally
imposed should be consecutive or concurrent to Bosier's other sentences?

2. Has Bosier failed to show that his sentence on remand was imposed in a
vindictive manner?

ARGUMENT

1.
Bosier Has Failed To Show That The District Court Was Without Jurisdiction To
Amend His Judgment On Remand To Indicate Whether The Sentence Oriainally
Imposed Should Be Consecutive Or Concurrent To Bosier's Other Sentences
A.

Introduction
Bosier asserts that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to

amend his judgment to provide his sentence in this case would run consecutive
to his Canyon County sentences where the district court failed to indicate in the
original judgment whether the sentences would run consecutive or concurrent.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 6-14.) Bosier's argument fails. The Court of Appeals'
decision remanded Bosier's case for "reinstatement of the original probation."

Bosier

at p. 3. Bosier has failed to establish the Court of Appeals' directive

precluded the district court from amending the judgment to provide that Bosier's
sentence in this case will run consecutive to his Canyon County cases because
there is no basis from which to conclude that "the original probation" was
concurrent to Bosier's Canyon County sentences.
B.

Standard Of Review
"'A question of jurisdiction is fundamental; it cannot be ignored when

brought to [the appellate courts'] attention and should be addressed prior to
considering the merits of an appeal."' State v. Kavaiecz, 139 ldaho 482, 483, 80
P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003) (quoting H & V Enaineerina, Inc. v. ldaho State Bd. of
Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, 113 ldaho 646, 648, 747 P.2d 55,

57 (1987)). Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, given free
review. Kavaiecz, 139 ldaho at 483, 80 P.3d at 1084.
The question of whether the sentence imposed is illegal is one of law,
subject to free review by the appellate court. State v. Hale, 116 ldaho 763, 779

I
P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1989).

C.

The Issue Of Whether The District Court Exceeded The Scope Of The
Remand Is Not Preserved For Appellate Review
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal."
State v. Carlson, 134 ldaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether
an issue was preserved presents a "threshold" inquiry. State v. Stevens, 115
I

I

Idaho 457, 459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989). Bosier did not object to the
district court's pronouncement at the hearing upon remand that his sentence was
to run consecutive to his previously imposed Canyon County sentences and

I

therefore did not preserve his claim of error for appellate review.
An unpreserved issue may be raised for the first time on appeal if the error
claimed is fundamental. State v. McAway, 127 ldaho 54, 60, 896 P.2d 962, 968
(1995); State v. Lavy, 121 ldaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992).
Fundamental error has been defined as "such error as goes to the foundation or
basis of a defendant's rights or must go to the foundation of the case or take from
the defendant a right which was essential to his defense and which no court
could or ought to permit him to waive." State v. Knowlton, 123 ldaho 916, 918,
854 P.2d 259, 261 (1993). An error is fundamental when it so profoundly distorts

the proceedings that it "produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of
his fundamental right to due process." State v. McCutcheon, 129 ldaho 168,
169, 922 P.2d 1094, 1095 (Ct. App 1996) (citing

Lavy, 121 ldaho at 844, 828

P.2d at 873; State v. Mauro, 121 ldaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 109, 111 (1991)).
Bosier has not claimed the action by the district court in amending Bosier's
original order of probation to include the term directing his sentence to run
consecutively to the Canyon County sentences rises to the level of a
fundamental error.
The question of jurisdiction is fundamental, and may be brought to the
court's attention at any time. State v. Lundauist, 134 ldaho 831, 835, 11 P.3d 27,
31 (2000). Bosier does assert that the district court was without jurisdiction.
However, Bosier provides no authority for the proposition that the issue of a court
exceeding its authority on remand is a jurisdictional issue. State v. Zichko, 129
ldaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) ("When issues on appeal are not
supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be
considered.") As such, Bosier has failed to properly preserve the issue of
whether or not the district court acted within its discretion to amend the judgment
reinstating his original probation to reflect the court's intent that the underlying
sentence run consecutively to Bosier's Canyon County sentences.
D.

If Preserved For Appeal, On Remand. The District Court Followed The
Directive Of The Court Of A~peals In Reinstatina Bosier's Oriainal
Probation
If the issue is determined to be preserved for appeal, Bosier has failed to

show that the district court acted outside its jurisdiction in amending the judgment

to reflect his sentence was to run consecutively to the Canyon County sentences.
Following remand, the district court held a hearing at which it noted the original
judgment failed to indicate whether the sentence was to run consecutive to or
concurrent with the sentences in the Canyon County cases. (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 1923.) The court stated its intent that the sentence be consecutive. (Tr., p. 6, L. 24

- p. 7, L. 5 ("It would be the Court's intent, in the event that the Canyon County
matter was entered as a sentence before this Court sentenced the defendant,
that this sentence would be consecutive to that.").)
Bosier argues the district court was without jurisdiction to amend the
judgment to reflect the court's intent that the sentence run consecutive to the
Canyon County sentences. Specifically, Bosier asserts the order of the Court of
Appeals to reinstate Bosier's original probation left the district court with only a
ministerial act and the amendment was beyond the scope of that act.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 7-9.) Bosier relies on State v. Hosey, 134 ldaho 883, 11
P.3d 1101 (2000), Hummer v. Evans, 132 ldaho 830,979 P.2d 1188 (1999), and
I.A.R. 38 in support of his jurisdictional argument. Hosey, Hummer, and I.A.R. 38
do not support Bosier's argument that the district court acted without authority
when, in reinstating Bosier's probation, the court amended Bosier's judgment to
reflect that his sentence would run consecutive to the Canyon County sentences.
"The general rule is that, on remand, a trial court has the authority to take
actions it is specifically directed to take, or those which are subsidiary to the
actions directed by the appellate court." Hosey, 134 ldaho at 886, 11 P.3d at
1104 (citation omitted). The Court in Hummer, in holding that the trial court was

without jurisdiction to address the issue of attorney's fees following a remand for
entry of an amended judgment, noted that "[a] trial court has no authority to enter
any judgment or order not in conformity with the order of the appellate court."
Hummer, 132 ldaho at 833, 979 P.2d at 1191 (quoting Walters. v. Industrial
Indemnity Company, 130 ldaho 836 949, P.2d 22 (1997)). Contrary to Bosier's
assertion, the district court's actions on remand were, as required by Hummer,
"in conformity with" the Court of Appeals' directive. The district court reinstated
Bosier's original probation.

'

While the district court also amended the judgment

to address a matter previously overlooked -- the consecutive or concurrent
nature of Bosier's sentence as it related to his previously imposed Canyon
County sentences

-- such amendment merely addressed an issue subsidiary to

and in conformity with the act of reinstating Bosier's probation as directed by the
Court of Appeals. Bosier has failed to establish otherwise.
Bosier's argument that amending the judgment to reflect whether his
sentence was consecutive or concurrent with his Canyon County sentences fails.
The Court of Appeals did not reach, nor was it presented, any claim having to do
with the concurrent or consecutive nature of the sentence. On the contrary, the
court ultimately concluded only that Bosier was entitled to reinstatement of his
probation. Once that is accomplished, Bosier has received the full benefit of the
Court of Appeals' order.

Whether his sentence runs concurrently or

' Bosier argues and the state concedes that the district court erroneously
amended the judgment to modiv the start date of Bosier's probation in this case.
The judgment should therefore be amended to include the original language that
Bosier's probation commenced on October 3, 2007.

consecutively if that probation is violated is merely subsidiary to the Court of
Appeals' mandate.
Bosier's argument on appeal appears to rely on the premise that the
original judgment vested a right to have this sentence run concurrent to the
Canyon County sentences. Bosier has failed to cite to any authority that he was
entitled to such a presumption. Absent such a showing, the district court had the
authority to impose a consecutive sentence and did not lose jurisdiction on
remand to do so.2 See State v. Cisneros-Gonzalez, 141 Idaho 494, 112 P.3d
782 (2004) (Idaho courts have a common law discretionary power to impose
sentences cumulative to those previously imposed).
Because Bosier has failed to show that he had the presumption of a
concurrent sentence, he has failed to show that the district court acted outside of
the authority given it by the Court of Appeals on remand to amend the judgment

Bosier also relies on I.A.R. 38 in support of his jurisdictional argument,
however, such reliance is also misplaced. As it relates to the issuance of
remittiturs, the rule provides:
When the opinion filed has become final in accordance with this
rule, the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall issue and file a remittitur
with the district court or administrative agency appealed from and
mail copies to all parties to the appeal and to the presiding district
judge or chairman of the agency. The remittitur shall advise the
district court or administrative agency that the opinion has become
final and that the district court or administrative agency shall
forthwith comply with the directive of the opinion.
I.A.R. 38 (c). Bosier incorrectly asserts that the district court was in violation of
the provisions of I.A.R. 38 because "[ilnstead of performing the task directed to it"
by the Court of Appeals, the "district court unilaterally determined that it wanted
to sentence Mr. Bosier anew." (Appellant's brief, p. 10.) Because the district
court did in fact comply with the directive of the opinion issued by the Court of
Appeals by reinstating Bosier's original probation, Bosier's claim that the district
court violated Rule 38 also fails.

reinstating his original probation to reflect the court's intent that Bosier's
underlying sentence run consecutive to his Canyon County cases.
11.
Bosier Has Failed to Show That His Sentence On Remand Was Imposed In A
Vindictive Manner

Bosier asserts for the first time on appeal that the same district court judge
who originally sentenced him impermissibly increased his sentence because
Bosier was successful on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-17.) Initially, it is the
I

state's position that Bosier has failed to properly preserve this issue for appeal by
failing to raise it in front of the district court, which was in the best position to

I

I

outline the reasons other than vindictiveness, if present, that any perceived
increase in Bosier's sentence occurred. Carlson, 134 Idaho at 398, 3 P.3d at 76
("it is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection

I

must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal.").
If the court does conclude that Bosier's claim that his sentence upon

remand was imposed in a vindictive manner has been properly preserved for
appeal, the only remaining issue for this Court to determine based on the state's
earlier concession that the extension of Bosier's probationary period by atmost
two years was improper, is whether the pronouncement that Bosier's sentence
run consecutive to the sentences previously imposed in the Canyon County
cases in accordance with the district court's intent was an increase of Bosier's
sentence done for the purpose of punishing Bosier for exercising his right to an
appeal. Bosier has failed to show that the sentence he received on remand was
a harsher sentence motivated by his successful appeal.

A court violates a defendant's constitutional due process rights when it
imposes a heavier sentence "if the motivation for the heavier sentence was to
penalize the defendant" for exercising his rights. State v. Clark, 136 ldaho 529,
534, 37 P.3d 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711, 725-26 (1969), rev'd. in part Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S.Ct.
2201 (1989)). Where the sentence is harsher, there is generally a "'presumption
of vindictiveness, which may be overcome only by objective information in the
record justihing the increased sentence."'

Clark,136 ldaho at 531, 37 P.3d at 28

(quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 374 (1982)).
Bosier fails to support his assertion that the district court sought to
increase his sentence after a successful appeal. As explained above, the district
court did not, in fact, increase Bosier's sentence on remand. The amendment to
the reinstatement of Bosier's original probation merely effectuated the district
court's intent to run the underlying sentence consecutive to the previously
imposed Canyon County cases.

Running the sentence consecutively did not

actually increase the length of the sentence. As such, Bosier has failed to
establish a claim of vindictiveness.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court uphold the district court's
third amended judgment of conviction in all respects except the condition
I

I

providing for commencement
Dated this 1 6 ' ~day of March,

I
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